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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
POWER OF COURT TO SET UPSET PRICE IN FORECLOSURE SALEDUTY AND RIGHT OF TRUSTEE To Bm FOR BONDHOLDER.-In the
recent case of Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Robin,' the
Illinois Supreme Court has overturned much of the recent judicial
legislation of the trial and appellate courts with respect to mortgage foreclosures. The Supreme Court has swept aside the Bamburg 2 and Robin 3 decisions of the Appellate Court and distinguished and greatly limited the scope of the Straus case.4 To the
innovations enunciated in those cases, principally the power of
the court to set an upset price and to compel the trustee to bid
for the amount of the indebtedness, the Supreme Court has said

significantly: "The existence of financial panic does not warrant
the setting aside of well-known rules of law to meet an alleged
emergency. "
The present case came up on an appeal from the Appellate
Court for the First District. This case and the Bamburg case
were considered together before that court, inasmuch as the facts
1 Case No. 22885 (I1. Supreme Ct., 1935).
2 Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Bamburg, 278 IlL App. 1 (1934).

8 Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Robin, 278 Ill. App. 20 (1934).
4 Straus v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 273 Ill. App. 63 (1933).
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of the two were almost identical and raised the same principles
of law. Both cases involved the foreclosure of trust deeds securing large bond issues. In those cases, the court held that it had
authority to fix an upset price, and to compel the trustee to bid
in the property on behalf of the bondholders for the amount of
the indebtedness. The Appellate Court based its decision squarely
upon the Straus case.
In reversing the judgment in the Robin case, the Supreme
Court absolutely repudiated the doctrine that the chancellor
has authority to set an upset price, pointing out that while it
is true that the approval or disapproval of a foreclosure sale
rests within the discretion of the chancellor, "mere inadequacy
of price alone is not cause for setting aside a judicial sale.'' 5
The Appellate Court had to meet this objection by attempting to
bring these cases within the purview of the rule that where the
conditions under which a sale is held tend to reduce or destroy
competition, it is proper for the court to set aside the sale.6
However, it becomes apparent upon inspection of cases citing
the rule, that reference is not had merely to general economic
conditions which apply equally to any and all judicial sales, but
only to special circumstances tending to reduce or destroy competition with respect to particular sales.
The Supreme Court denies not merely the power of the chancellor to compel the trustee to bid for the stockholders, but even
the right of the trustee within his own discretion to bid, and distinguishes the Robin and Bamburg cases from the Straus case
upon the ground that in the Straus case the trustee is expressly
empowered in the trust deed to bid on behalf of the bondholders,
whereas there is an absence of any such language in the trust
deeds in the other two cases. The court held that the trust deed
and the bonds constitute a contract between the bondholders
themselves, and between them as a group and the trustee and
mortgagor, and then continued: "This court does not have the
power to import into a contract other or additional provisions.
To do so would be making a new contract for the parties. 7 We
cannot construe a contract along the line of what we might believe would be a better contract for the parties to make, as equity
vests no wide discretion in the chancellor such as would permit
him to disturb contract rights of property. s A contract right is
a property right." 9
5 Springer v. Law, 185 Ill.
542 (1900) ; Skakel v. Cycle Trade Publishing
482 (1909).
Co., 237 Ill.
324, 96 N. E. 306 (1911); Smith v.
6 Bondurant v. Bondurant, 251 Ill.
Huntoon, 134 I1. 24, 24 N. E. 971 (1890).
7 Burt v. Garden City Sand Co., 237 111.473 (1909).
8 Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 158 F. 923 (1907).
9 Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 136 U3. S. 89, 34 L. Ed. 379

(1890).
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The supposed right of the chancellor to set an upset price
is clearly gone, while the right of the trustee to bid upon behalf
of the bondholders is limited at least to those cases where the
trustee is expressly authorized to do so in the trust deed. In
common with several other paternalistic theories designed to meet
the needs of the present financial crisis, the doctrine of the
Straus case has had its wings clipped. That the Straus case,
along with these other theories, had various admirable attributes
cannot be denied. For a time it appeared to have solved the
dilemma of large bond issue foreclosures. That the doctrine was
equitable and would in general have promoted a fairer distribution of the proceeds of the property in question must be conceded. However, there are many contracts in litigation which
might be rewritten more "equitably" by the courts. Such terms
should be supplied, not by a legislatively inclined judiciary, but
by the parties to the contract or by the legislature in advance as
general terms of all contracts of the class. However much the
loss of the practical benefits of the Straus case may be regretted,
it is gratifying to see the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirming
property rights and defending such rights against the makeshift
encroachments born of the depression.
G. S. STANSELL
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHT AFTER FORECLOSURE TO PROVE CLAIM IN

BANKRUPTCY IN FULL WHERE BANKRUPT HAS CONVEYED SUBJECT TO MORTGAGE.-In Ivanhoe Building & Loan Association of

Newark v. Orr,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
creditor of a bankrupt could prove for the full amount of his
debt even though he had recovered a portion of it by foreclosure
of a mortgage on property originally pledged as security for the
debt, but since conveyed by the bankrupt to a third party "subject to" the mortgage.
The court's own statement of the facts reads: "The owners of
real estate in Newark, N. J., executed to the petitioner a bond
in the penal sum of $23,000, conditioned for the payment of
$11,500 secured by a mortgage on the land. The mortgagors
subsequently conveyed the premises to the Eastern Sash and
Door Company, which expressly assumed the mortgage debt.
That company afterward conveyed to one Yavne. A default occurred, and the petitioner filed a foreclosure bill against Yavne.
The amount due was found to be $10,220.96, with interests and
costs. The property was sold by the sheriff and bid in by the
petitioner for $100. Meanwhile the sash and door company had
been adjudicated a bankrupt. The petitioner presented a claim
against the estate for $10,739.94, the amount then due on the
155 S. Ct. 685, 79 L. Ed. 735 (1935).
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bond less the $100 bid at the sale. It was stipulated that the
mortgaged property acquired in foreclosure was worth $9,000.
The referee reduced the claim to the difference--$1,739.94---and
ruled 2the petitioner was not entitled to prove for any greater
sum. "

This ruling was confirmed by the district court and the
circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed it, and
decreed that the petitioner was entitled to prove the full amount
rather than only the difference between the value of the security
and the principal amount. The court acknowledged the force of
the direction of the Bankruptcy Act, section 57e, that "claims of
secured creditors . . . shall be allowed for such sums only as to
the courts seem to be owing over and above the value of their
securities. . . ."a
Courts have applied this section directly on numerous occasions, 4 but it seems established that the creditor may abandon
his security and prove his claim as unsecured for the full
amount. 5 Of course the filing of a secured debt as an unsecured
claim operates as a waiver of the security, and precludes the
creditor from attempting to enforce it thereafter. 6
But the court here held that petitioner was not a secured creditor in the terms of section 1 (23) of the Act, which declares
that " 'Secured creditor' shall include a creditor who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature
to be assignable under this Act, or who owns such a debt for
which some indorser, surety, or other persons secondarily liable
for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's assets. "7
The property securing the mortgage here foreclosed had ceased
to be owned by the bankrupt; thus the petitioner was excluded
from the Act's definition of a "secured creditor."
The court cited some fifteen decisions of Federal district and
circuit courts applying similar interpretations of the definition."
255

S.Ct. 686, 79 L. Ed. 736 (1935).

3 U. S. C. tit. 11, sec. 93 (e), 11 USCA sec. 93 (e).
4In re Hines, 144 F. 543 (1906); In re Dix, 176 F. 582 (1910); In re

Baughman, 163 F. 669 (1908) ; In re Graves, 182 F. 443 (1910); In re J. G.
Reichard & Bros., 230 F. 525 (1916); In re Bash, 245 F. 808 (1917); In re
Mayer, 41 F. (2d) 856 (1930).
5 Black, H. C., Handbook of the Law and Practice in Bankruptcy (West
Pub. Co., 1930), p.395. In re Little, 110 F. 621 (1901) ; Stewart-Noble Drug
Co. v. Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co., 62 Colo. 197, 162 P. 159 (1917) ; In re
Interborough Realty Co., 223 F. 646 (1915).
6 In re O'Gara Coal Co., 12 F. (2d) 426 (1926); In re Luber, 261 F. 221
(1919); United States Trust Co. v. Gordon, 216 F. 929 (1914); In re Burr
Mfg. & Supply Co., 217 F. 16 (1914).
7 U. S. C. tit. 11, sec. 1 (23), 11 USCA sec. 1 (23).
8 In the principal case, the court says the point here under consideration
was involved and necessarily decided, though not adverted to, in Hiscock v.
Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 27 S. Ct. 681, 51 L. Ed. 945 (1907), reviewing
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Most of these concerned debts secured by collateral -pledged by
a surety for the bankrupt. They are, of course, directly in point
if we consider, first, that at the time it assumed the mortgage
the sash and door company was primarily liable and the petitioner was a "secured creditor," since the property then did belong to the company; and, second, that after the conveyance to
Yavne, title vested absolutely in him, though the company remained primarily liable for the debt. In a sense, Yavne and his
property were sureties only. And in this sense the debt, as that
of the bankrupt company, was not secured by any mortgage of
its own property:
Clearly, the decision is important not as a novel principle of
law, but rather because it appears to be the first direct expression
of the Supreme Court upon this section of the Bankruptcy Act,
because it touches a point likely to arise frequently in practice,
and because it so clearly defines the remedies of the mortgagee in
such a situation.
C. E. Fox
MAY AN OPINION BE THE BASIS OF AN ACTION IN FRAUD AND

DECEIT ?-The Illinois Appellate Court was confronted with a
question involving fraud and deceit in the case of Wemple State
Bank v. Continental Illinois Company.1 The plaintiff alleged in
its complaint that it was a corporation doing a banking business
in Waverly, Illinois, a town of 1,300 inhabitants; that its capital
stock was $50,000; and that it had purchased $100,000 worth of
securities from the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company, the predecessor of defendant. The plaintiff then alleged
that the defendant was its Chicago correspondent and depositary; that, at various times, the defendant undertook to advise the
plaintiff with respect to the value of certain of its securities; that
on September 20, 1931, the plaintiff held securities that had been
purchased of defendant; that plaintiff went to defendant for information and advice; that the defendant undertook the duty
In re Mertens et al., 147 F. 177 (1906), where a creditor of the bankrupt partnership was held entitled to prove his claim in full, notwithstanding he held
insurance policies on the life of one of the partners pledged as security by
the partner as an individual for the partnership debt. See also In re Headley,
97 F. 765 (1899); Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 117 F. 1 (1902);
In re Noyes Bros., 127 F. 286 (1903); In re Sweetser, 128 F. 165 (1904);
Gorman v. Wright, 136 F. 164 (1905) ; Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County v.
Hurley et al., 169 F. 92 (1909) ; In re Bailey, 176 F. 990 (1910); In re H. V.
Keep Shirt Co., 200 F. 80 (1912); In re Thompson, 208 F. 207 (1913) ; Young
v. Gordon et al., 219 F. 168 (1914); In re Pan-American Match Co., 242 F.
995 (1917); In re Anderson, 11 F. (2d) 380 (1926) ; Hampel v. Minkwitz,
18 F. (2d) 3 (1927), reversed on other grounds in 276 U. S. 299, 48 S. Ct. 308,
72 L. Ed. 582 (1928) ; Bankers' Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 73 F. (2d) 296
(1934), cert. den. 55 S. Ct. 405, 79 L. Ed. 353 (1935).
1279 Ill. App. 224 (1935).
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and promised to advise the plaintiff concerning all securities contained in its portfolio; that the defendant advised the plaintiff
as to all of its securities, except certain Insull gold debentures,
for which it had no opinion. The plaintiff then alleged that the
defendant had an opinion; that it knew that the Insull securities
had a low book value; that all of the assets of the Insull utilities
were pledged to the defendant bank and New York banks to
secure collateral loans made to the Insull company; that the
defendant knew that if it were to advise the plaintiff to sell, it
would cause the market price of said securities to decline further; that instead, they refrained from advising plaintiffs, thereby impliedly recommending that plaintiff hold said securities;
that plaintiff did not sell said securities, to its own damage. The
first, second and fourth counts were substantially the same; however, in the third count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
advised plaintiff not to sell. The defendant demurred to all
counts. The lower court sustained the demurrer and the Appellate Court upheld the ruling of the lower court.
The court, in its opinion, held that as between vendor and
vendee, there is a certain amount of "puffing" and prevarication allowed by the seller; and that therefore, the plaintiff had
stated no duty upon which he had a right to rely.
In Vulcan Metals Company v. Simmons Manufacturing Company,2 the Circuit Court of Appeals held that an opinion is a
fact, and may be a very relevant fact; that the expression of an
opinion is the assertion of a belief, and that if stated by one having knowledge superior to that of the other person, it is actionable. Matters of opinion which might not otherwise be the basis
of an action for fraud and deceit, are sometimes fraudulent, as,
for example, where the party falsely stating his opinions has
superior means of knowledge.
In Hedin v. Minnesota Medical and Surgical Institute,3 the
court stated that an opinion may be actionable; that if one makes
a statement of his belief in such terms that it amounts to an acknowledgement of a fact, he is liable; that if the opinion is designedly false, or advantage is taken of the other party in a
manner which is clearly oppressive, without negligence on the
part of the latter, there may be fraud, although the statement
is only in the form of an opinion; that false statements as to
the value of property, where relied upon, are representations of
fact and not opinions.
In Kenner v. Harding,4 the defendant sought to sell plaintiff
a piece of land. The defendant represented to plaintiff that one
2248 F. 853 (1918). See also Snively v. Meixsell, 97 Ill. App. 365 (1901).
8 62 Minn. 146, 63 N. W. 613, 35 L. R. A. 417 (1895). See also 2 Cooley on
Torts, sec. 361.
4 85 III. 264 (1877). See also Spencer Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation.
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Delay was desirous of purchasing the same from defendant. The
defendant, by prearrangement with Delay, influenced the latter
to represent to plaintiff that he desired to purchase the land in
question, which statements were in fact false and merely resorted
to in order to induce plaintiff to make the pu''chase. The plaintiff did act to his detriment. The court stated that the general
rule of law was that the mere statements of the vendor as to the
value of the land were not, of themselves, such evidence of legal
fraud as would authorize a recovery, but that a different rule
applied to a case where the statement came from a third party,
not known to have any interest in magnifying the value of the
land; that the plaintiff had a right to rely and expect that he
would get an honest representation from others; that he was not
required to anticipate that they were in conspiracy with the
defendant to deceive him.
In Medbury and others v. Watson,5 the court stated that the
distinction between representations made by a seller to the buyer
and those made by a third person to the buyer is marked and obvious; that in the one instance, the buyer is aware of his position; that he is dealing at arm's length with the owner of the
property whose aim it is to secure a good price, and whose interest it is to put a high estimate upon his estate; that his object is
to put the purchaser in such a state of mind as to induce him to
purchase; that in the other instance, the one who makes the false
statement has no object to gain; that he stands in the situation
of a disinterested person, in the light of a friend, who has no
motive or intention to depart from the truth, and who thus
throws the vendor off his guard and exposes him to be misled
by the deceitful representations. It was held that the plaintiff
could recover.
A case very similar to the Illinois Appellate decisions was
decided by the Federal court in Nevada Bank of San Francisco
v. Portland National Bank.6 The plaintiff brought an action in
fraud and deceit. Hazen, the cashier of the defendant bank,
wrote a letter addressed to the plaintiff, containing a false statement concerning the financial condition of one of the defendant's
depositors. This was done in response to a request on behalf of
the plaintiff. The defendant was a creditor of the person under
inquiry. In order to make the plaintiff extend a loan to the
third party, which money would then be credited to the indebtedness held by the defendant, the defendant misrepresented the
condition of the third person to the plaintiff. In the second
count, the plaintiff alleged that defendant recklessly made such
statements. The complaint was demurred to, but the court
held that the plaintiff had made out a cause of action. The
5 47 Mass. 246 (1843). See also Britton v. Brewster, 2 F. 160 (1880).
659 F. 338 (1893). But see Randolph v. Allen, 73 F. 23 (1896).
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upper court sustained the lower court and held that where one
who is not the purchaser or seller makes misrepresentations, the
other party is not dealing with the prior party at arm's length
and that such opinions are statements of fact upon which the
plaintiff may rely.
In view of the decisions of Illinois and other jurisdictions, the
Illinois Appellate case appears erroneous. The defendant in the
appellate case was neither seller nor purchaser, and it made such
statements to one who had a right to rely thereon. The defendant
occupied a position something akin to a fiduciary relationship.
The plaintiff was a small town bank which sought the defendant's
advice because the defendant was in Chicago, the financial center
of the middle west, and also because of the fact that it was the
plaintiff's Chicago correspondent and depositary.
In the light of all the facts alleged in the declaration-which
must be taken as true on demurrer-the demurrer should have
been overruled.
W. J. J. WAHLER
DISTRIBUTION TO INCOME AND CORPUS OF RETURNS FROM TRUST

INVESTMENTS.-When securities are placed in trust by a settlor,
unless provision is made to the contrary, it is generally held that
the life tenant is entitled to the nominal income from the investment even though the securities were purchased above par, and
although they were priced at a premium when the trust began.1
If the trustee purchases the securities after the creation of the
trust, however, a problem arises as to whether. the tenant should
receive the nominal or actual yield.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently had a
perplexing problem to solve in the case of Old Colony Trust Company v. Comstock. 2 Under the will of William C. Winslow it
was provided that the trustee should pay to the testator's daughter, during her life, the net income from the trust. The controversy involved only securities purchased by the trustee, some
above and some below par. Three questions were raised by the
appeal:
1. Is the life tenant entitled to the full dividend return of
preferred stocks that are callable at less than the purchase
price ?
2. What part of the nominal income from bonds purchased
above par goes to the life tenant and what part belongs to
corpus, especially where the amount paid is in excess of
the call price?
1 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Williams, 195 N. E. 393 (Mass., 1935)
Ballantine v. Young, 76 N. J. Eq. 613, 75 A. 1100 (1910) ; In re Connecticut
Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 80 Conn. 540, 69 A. 360 (1908).
2 195 N. E. 389 (Mass., 1935).
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3. If the bonds are purchased below par, is the life tenant
entitled to the actual yield, or is he limited to the nominal
return ?
The trustee had purchased at more than par value preferred
stocks which were callable on ninety days' notice from any dividend date at a figure less than the purchase price. Part of the
dividend was withheld as an amortization fund to insure the
retention of the principal of this investment. The plan under
which the trustee proposed to operate would reduce the accounting value of the stock to the call price within a period of five
years. It was held that te trustee was not justified in withholding part of the dividends. The court said on this point, "We
think the factors respecting this callable stock were too vague
to justify the application of hmortization. There is no fixed term
for it to run and no call date." No authority was cited to support the contention, nor has the writer been able to find any
case directly in point.
In the same trust, a number of the bonds were purchased at
a premium and some of them in excess of the call price. On this
point the court held that the trustee should retain out of each
interest payment an amount sufficient to amortize the amount in
excess of the call price to the call date of the bond, and the
balance in excess of the par value to the maturity of the bond.
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia oppose
the amortization of premiums out of interest and place the loss
resulting from sale or maturity of the premium bonds on trust
capital. 3 The great weight of opinion is, however, that the life
tenant should assume the burden of the premiums. 4
The decision in Hemenway v. Hemenway5 left the position of
the Massachusetts court on this subject somewhat doubtful for
a time. It was held in that case that the trustee was not justified
in taking out of the gross income an amount sufficient to reimburse the estate for the premiums paid. The court, however, made
it clear that they were not laying down a sweeping principle.
It was pointed out that premiums may be paid either for security of capital or for a higher interest rate. Whatever doubt may
have existed as to the propriety of amortizing bond premiums
was removed by the decision in New England Trust Company v.
Eaton.6 It was there unequivocally held that it is the duty of
s Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892) ; In re Penn-Gaskell's Estate,
208 Pa. 346, 57 A. 715 (1904); American Security & Trust Co. v. Payne, 33
App. D. C. 178 (1909).
4 Ballantine v. Young, 76 N. J. Eq. 613, 75 A. 1100 (1910); In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209 (1921); In re Well's Estate, 156 Wis.
294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913) ; Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N. Y. 495, 130 N. E.
625 (1921); Curtis v. Osborn, 79 Conn. 555, 65 A. 968 (1907).
5 134 Mass. 446 (1883).
6 140 Mass. 532, 4 N. E. 69 (1886).
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the trustee to keep the capital intact and to amortize the premiums out of the interest. The Court of Appeals of New York in
In re Stevens 7 said, "In the absence of a clear direction to the
contrary, where investments are made by the trustee, the principal must be maintained intact from loss by payment of premium on securities having only a definite time to run." Following this line of reasoning, although the point has apparently
never been decided before, the court in the principal case seems
justified in holding that the amount paid in excess of the call
price was rightfully amortized to the call date of the bonds.
It was contended by the life tenant that if the burden of the
premiums would fall on her, she should have the benefit of
the purchases made at a discount. The court decided according
to the weight of authority and according to the rule laid down in
New England Trust Company v. Eaton that the life tenant is
not entitled to the increment on the bonds that were purchased
by the trustee below par. The court said, "No decision, so far
as we are aware, supports the contention of the life tenant. There
are several authorities rejecting it after consideration." Holmes
in his dissenting opinion in New England Trust Company v.
Eaton said, "I do not see why it does not follow that if a bond is
bought below par, the tenant for life is equally entitled to the
annual increment on the interest received by him as the bond
gradually reaches maturity." It may be that the life tenant
is going too far in insisting on a portion of the increment at each
interest date because it is not certain that the bonds will be paid
at maturity. However, when the face value of the bond is realized, the life tenant should logically be entitled to the amount
of the discount to compensate her for the amount of the income
she had to forego during the life of the bond. If the life tenant
is not entitled to share in the increment in bonds purchased
below par, it would be much to her advantage to have the funds
invested in securities selling at or above par. When the securities of a company sell below par, it may be attributed to the
fact that the interest rate is too low, or the security upon which
the investment rests is doubtful, or both. If a company has a
credit rating that would enable it to do financing at 5 per cent,
logically the yield would be 5 per cent even though the interest
rate was above or below that figure. On this assumption, if the
company desired to sell securities that would mature in twenty
years, and bear interest at the rate of 42 per cent, the price at
which they could be marketed would be $93.72. In that event the
life tenant would be entitled to only 42 per cent, and the corpus
would make a gain of $6.28 on every $100 invested. If the same
company desired to make the interest rate 5 per cent or more,
the life tenant would be entitled to a return of 5 per cent.
1 187 N. Y. 471, 80 N. E. 358 (1907).
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The court admits the logic of the life tenant's contentions, but
holds that as a practical matter, the accumulated bond discounts
ought not be paid to the life tenant as income, because, since it
is the duty of the trustee to keep all the money invested, there
is no fund out of which the accumulation from discount could
be made.
W. R. MACMILLAN
WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE MAY CORRECT A REPORT OF PROCEED-

INGS.-In the recent case of Weinstein v. Morris' the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District has given an interpretation to sections of the Civil Practice Act and rules of court with
reference to amending a report of proceedings, which is of interest only to the extent that it is the first expression by an appellate court on this point.
The precise point made is that the trial judge may amend the
report of proceedings to show the truth even after it has been
signed by another judge pursuant to the authority given under
the rules, 2 when for one of the specified reasons the trial judge
himself was not available at the time of the signing. In this case,
the trial judge was absent at the time the report of proceedings
was presented, and another judge of the same court signed it.
Subsequently, the trial judge corrected the certificate by adding
matters which should have been included and by showing that
the trial judge was absent at the time the statement of proceedings was presented to a judge of the same court. Even under
the old practice, a bill of exceptions which did not properly show
what transpired at the trial could be amended. 8 By applying the
section of the Civil Practice Act 4 which empowers the appellate
court to allow amendments to correct the record at any time, the
court finds that it properly allowed the amendment to the report
of proceedings in the instant case.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
SIGNATURE OF FOREMAN

OF GRAND

JURY AS DIRECTORY, NOT

People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard'
holds that the provision in the statute requiring the foroman of
the grand jury to sign every indictment 2 is directory, not mandatory. Failure to sign does not make the judgment void so that
it may be attacked by habeas corpus, but is a technical defect and
can only be reached by a writ of error. The petitioner in the
1281 I1. App. 12 (1935).

MANDATORY.-The recent case of

2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 259.36 (c).

8C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 150 I1. 607 (1894).

4Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 216 (c).

1361 Inl. 60, 196 N. E. 827 (1935).
2Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 78, par. 17.
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case brought habeas corpus proceedings to be released from the
Illinois Reformatory on the ground that the proceedings under
which she was held were a nullity, in that the indictment, while
otherwise regular, was not signed by the foreman of the grand
jury, although it was inscribed "a true bill." A motion to quash
had been overruled and while a motion in arrest of judgment was
pending, the court recalled the grand jury and permitted the
foreman in open court to sign his name on the indictment. The
petitioner claimed that the failure to sign was jurisdictional and
that therefore the judgment could be attacked by habeas corpus.
The court affirmed the rule that habeas corpus cannot be
used to question a judgment unless such judgment was null and
void for lack of jurisdiction-that the proper method of attack
on formal defects is by writ of error. The court then said that
the failure of the foreman to endorse the indictment was not
fatal because that requirement is directory only and merely matter of form for the convenience of the court.
The court stated that it expressly overruled a case of one hundred and ten years standing, that of Nomaque v. People.3 In the
Nomaque case there had been no finding of any kind on the indictment, which of course would render it void. Further, it was
not signed by the foreman. The essential requisite is that the
foreman write the finding as a true bill, and where that is lacking, the proceedings may be attacked by habeas corpus. The present case holds that a mere failure to endorse his name thereon
cannot be held fatal. The facts of this case can be clearly distinguished from those of the Nomaque case. Nevertheless, under
the facts of the latter case there were two points decided-the
necessity of an indorsement on the indictment, "a true bill," and
the necessity of a verification of this finding by the foreman of
the grand jury over his signature. On this latter point the case
of Nomaque v. People is expressly overruled.
HELEN W. MUNSERT
EFFECT OF PROVISION IN WILL FOR EMPLOYMENT OF A NAMED
ATTORNEY UPON EXECUTOR'S RIGHT TO SELECT ANOTHER.-This
problem was presented for the first time to an Illinois Appellate
Court in the recent case of Conlan v. Sullivan.' This court, following the precedent laid down by a long line of English and
American cases, held that such provision is not mandatory upon
the executor.
The plaintiff as the executor of the will of Charles H. Sullivan,
filed a bill in equity praying for a construction of the following
provision: "I hereby request my executors and trustees .. .to
employ my friend, Frank A. O'Donnell, as their attorney in the
3 1 InI. (Breese) 145 (1825).
1280 Ill. App. 332 (1935).
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administration of my estate, and to pay him such compensation
as may be proper for such services or advice as he may be requested to render, and shall render service in the administration
of my estate." The lower court held for the defendant on the
grounds that this provision "constitutes a command to the Executors and Trustees to employ said Frank A. O'Donnell as
their attorney during the administration of said estate, and that
a trust was created in favor of Frank A. O'Donnell." On appeal
this decree was reversed.
In its decision, the Appellate Court did not go into the underlying theory of this question but turned to the settled authority
and found that sufficient in itself to overrule the lower court.
Two conclusions are given. First, this is an attorney-client relationship, in which the client always has the right of discharging the attorney. 2 Second, the provision canont be mandatory
regardless of the words used. The latter statement the court
supported by a review of the leading cases on this point,3 concluding, "The law appears to be that a trustee or executor is not
bound to employ an attorney even though the will uses such
words as 'direct,' 'command,' or 'appoint.' In the instant case
the words used are expressive of nothing more than a mere request." Although the decision could be supported on the ground
alone that the language was precatory, the result would have
been the same if mandatory language was used.
The lower court found that the provision created a "trust."
If this is a trust, it must be one of two kinds, either a trust
created for the benefit of the defendant attorney, or a single
provision in the whole trust which is created especially to benefit
the cestui que trust, and only incidentally for the defendant. The
first alternative is obviously impossible, for the essential element
of a trust res is completely lacking and without this no trust
can exist. 4 The second alternative, even though it were sustain-

able, can be of no value to the defendant, for the cestui alone
is the only person capable of enforcing this provision. The defendant as an incidental beneficiary would have no enforcible
right vested in him. 5 thus, upon the theory of trust alone the
2 Citing 6 Corpus Juris 676-678.
3 Citing In re Thistlethwaite, 104 N. Y. S.264 (1907) ; In re Ogier's Estate,
101 Cal. 381, 35 P. 900 (1894); Young v. Alexander, 16 Lea (84 Tenn.) 108
(1885) ; Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mer. 681, 36 Eng. Rep. 261 (1808) ; Williams v.
Corbett, 8 Sim. 349, 59 Eng. Rep. 138 (1837) ; Foster v. Elsley, 19 Ch. Div. 518
(1881); Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Cl. & Fin. 129, 7 Eng. Rep. 353 (1838); Finden
v. Stephens, 2 Ph. 142, 41 Eng. Rep. 896 (1846) ; Jewell v. Barnes' Admrs.,
110 Ky. 329, 61 S. W. 360 (1901). "Testamentary Directions to Employ," by
Austin Wakeman Scott, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 709.
4 Bogert on Trusts, Vol. 1, see. 182, which refers back to sec. 111.
5 "Testamentary Directions to Employ," by Austin Wakeman Scott, 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 713, and cases there cited.
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decision of the lower court cannot be sustained.
If this is not a trust, the next question is, may the defendant
have specific performance of this provision? Has the testator
created a positive obligation upon the executor to employ the defendant ? To use the word "employ" is to admit immediately
that, as between the executor and the lawyer, a relation of attorney and client exists. This will necessarily disprove the trust
theory. In this situation then, the defendant is seeking specifically to enforce a master and servant relation. In finding the
answer to this contention, the position of the trustee must first
be ascertained. The trustee has been given the complete legal
title of this estate to administer; in administering this estate
he is given certain discretionary powers; in exercising this power
rightly, he will not be liable to the estate, but if he has acted
unwisely and has committed a breach of trust, he is liable. To
construe this liability in relation to the proposition maintained
by the defendant, one thing clearly stands out. If the trustee in
taking the advice of the attorney has proceeded rightly in his
administration, the attorney ma be compensated, but his right
to compensation will arise through the right of the trustee to
collect from the estate. It is based on the theory of exoneration.
But if the advice of the attorney has caused a breach of the trust,
the trustee has no right of exoneration; he stands liable to the
estate. For the courts will not say that this provision in the
trust is such that the trustee may hide behind the acts of the
attorney.6 The testator, then, has not created a provision binding the estate, but he has attempted to create a binding personal
relationship of attorney and client. The two powers are in conflict with each other. If this relationship is the result of the provision in the trust, specific performance cannot be the remedy.7
Three fundamental reasons are given for denying this decree.
First, there is no mutuality of remedy. The attorney cannot have
a remedy where the trustee will be denied the same. Second, an
equity court will not grant specific performance of a contract of
services because of the difficulty of continually supervising the
conduct of the employee. Third, it is not a wise policy to force
upon the employer in a personal relationship, a person whom he
does not wish to have in his employment. Thus it is clear that
even if the plaintiff has a right, his remedy will not be through
specific performance.
If the defendant does not have a trust nor a right to specific
performance of an obligation, has he any right at all? Did this
provision in the will create an obligation which will give the
attorney a right to damages for breach? If there is a right to
damages, it must arise through the creation of the attorney-client
6 Ibid., p. 719.
7 Ibid., p. 717.
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relationship and not by trust. But a study of the will and the
effect upon it if this contention is sustainable, will show that
this was not the intent of the testator, for the testator has not
given to the attorney any specific thing, nor did he intend to;
he merely attempted to create a continuing relationship between
these parties. This the courts have decided is beyond his power.
Thus to allow the alternative of damages would be to say that
the testator has conferred a specific benefit upon the attorney,
such benefit to be paid in money taken in derogation of the
cestui que trust and yet the only beneficiary in this trust is the
cestui, and this is the only intent of the testator concerning the
giving of specific benefits.
It would seem, then, that this provision in the will has created
an interest which is without a remedy.
R. L. HUFF
LATENT AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY MISDESCRIPTION OF A LEGATEE.-

The ever perplexing problem of misdescription in a will arose
in the recent ease of Norton v. Jordan.' The plaintiffs in the
lower court, Mr. and Mrs. James M. Norton filed a bill in equity
to construe the will of their cousin, Mrs. Harriet L. Milligan and
petitioned the court that certain general and residuary legacies
given in the will to Mr. and Mrs. Richard Norton be interpreted
as to have been given to the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. James M.
Norton. Thirty of the thirty-two legatees were made parties defendant. Subsequently, one Richard Henry Norton, nephew of
the plaintiffs, and his wife, were made additional defendants.
Richard Henry Norton and his wife are not elsewhere mentioned
in the will. They disclaimed any interest in the legacies and bequests and by their bill admitted the allegations of the plaintiffs'
bill as amended.
The case in interesting because one plaintiff's given name was
different from that mentioned in the will and because of the fact
that there existed a person such as was described in the will.
The court decided in favor of the plaintiffs and based its
decision upon the theory of a latent ambiguity in the will. Latent
ambiguities, according to the decision, consist of two kinds:
first, a misnomer, where the description may apply to two things
or to two persons; second, a misdescription, which exists where
the extrinsic evidence discloses that there is no such person or
thing in existence, or, if in existence, the person is not the one
intended, or the thing does not belong to the testator. If extrinsic
evidence discloses such a latent ambiguity, it may be removed by
the same kind of evidence. If there exists a misdescription or
misnomer, the false words may be stricken and if a sufficient
description remains, when interpreted in the light of surround1360 111. 419 (1935).
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ing circumstances, to identify the object or subject of the
testator's gift with certainty, the will may be construed with the
false words eliminated. However, if after the words are stricken,
a sufficient description does not remain, the court will not strike
the false words and the legacy must fail for want of certainty.
It is interesting to note that the eight cases 2 which the court
cites in support of its decision deal with the misdescription of
land and not of devisces or legatees. But the problem is not new
in Illinois. In a case decided in 1890,3 the names of various
charitable corporations were improperly designated in a will.
The court in that case decided that a mistake in the name or
description of a legatee or devisee, whether an individual or a
corporation, will never render a bequest void if the name and
description used in the will, as applied to the facts and circumstances proved, will identify such person or corporation. The
court further held that it might inquire into every material fact
relating to the person who claims under the will, or to the property, or circumstances of the testator and his family and affairs
for the purposes of identifying the person intended by the
testator.
That is the doctrine which the court followed in the principal
case. The court mentioned and relied on an abundance of evidence extraneous to the will which firmly indicated that the
plaintiffs were the persons mentioned in the will, despite the
fact that there did exist a distant relative who bore the name
designated in the will. As was pointed out in the late case of
Morgan v. National Trust Bank,4 extrinsic evidence is never
admissible to alter, detract from or add to the terms of a will,
yet parol evidence is admissible to identify the beneficiaries and
place the court in the situation of the testator and disclose what
he had in mind at the time of the making of the will. The same
doctrine of striking repugnant description where there is sufficient description' remaining to identify the property in the construction of a deed was followed in the recent case of Brunotte
v. DeWitt." The theory of striking the bad and retaining the
good received the sanction of the United States Supreme Court
in Patch v. White6 as early as 1886.
2 Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed. 860 (1886); Bimslager v.
Bimslager, 323 IMl.303, 154 N. E. 135 (1926); Gano v. Gano, 239 111.539, 88
N. E. 146 (1909); Collins v. Capps, 235 Ill. 560, 85 N. E. 934 (1908); Felkel
v. O'Brien, 231 111. 329, 83 N. E. 170 (1907) ; Huffman v. Young, 170 l. 290,
49 N. E. 570 (1897) ; Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N. E. 553 (1895);
Decker v. Decker, 121 I1.341, 12 N. E. 750 (1887).
0 Woman's Union Missionary Society of America v. Mead, 131 IM. 338, 23
N. E. 603 (1890).
4 331 I1. 182, 162 N. E. 888 (1928).
5360 IMI.
518 (1935).
6 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed. 860 (1886).
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In the principal case of Norton v. Jordan,7 the task of the
Illinois Supreme Court was made much easier by the fact that
Richard Henry Norton whose name was similar to that mentioned in the will, disclaimed any interest in the will, leaving the
court to consider surrounding circumstances in assuring itself
that the plaintiffs were the persons intended in the will.
R. A. REMPERT

Is THE REMoVAL OF REFUSE AND GARBAGE A GOVERNMENTAL OR
A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION OF A MUNICIPALITY AS FAR AS LIABILITY
OF THE MUNICIPALITY FOR THE TORTS OF ITS SERVANTS IS

CON-

CERNED ?-Illinois courts have further extended the liability of
municipal corporations for the torts of their agents in the case
of Wasilevitsky v. City of Chicago.' Here another case is taken
out of the possible category of governmental functions and
classed squarely in the category of proprietary or corporate functions wherein the city is liable for the torts of its servants. In
this case the plaintiff was struck and severely injured by a garbage truck and trailers of the City of Chicago while plaintiff was
placing some goods in his parked automobile in front of his home.
The truck and trailers were being operated by the city in the
removal of garbage and refuse from the streets and alleys. The
court held that the city was in this case acting in a proprietary
capacity and not in its governmental capacity and was therefore
liable for torts committed by its servants while so acting.
The distinction between proprietary functions and governmental functions and the liability of the city for torts of its
servants in the former and not in the latter is generally recognized.2 The reason given is that the governmental functions, such
as police and fire regulation, are not performed in the interest
of the city in its private corporate capacity but in the interests
of the public generally; that these functions are really governmental duties delegated to the municipality by the legislature
and in the exercise of them the municipality is an agent of the
state. The proprietary or corporate functions, on the other hand,
are voluntarily assumed with the permission of the legislature
and are exercised for the benefit of the municipal locality and
its inhabitants. 3

7360 Ill.
419 (1935).
1280 Ill. App. 531 (1935).
2 City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371, 46 N. E. 244 (1897) ; City of Chicago
v. Williams, 182 Ill. 135, 55 N. E. 123 (1899); Normal School v. City of
Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N. E. 573 (1916); Hanrahan v. City of Chicago,
289 Ill. 400, 124 N. E. 547 (1919) ; Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 1l. 494,
101 N. E. 960 (1913); Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231 Il. 223, 83 N. E. 223
(1907).
3 City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371, 46 N. E. 244 (1897) ; Evans v. City
of Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223 (1907).
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The difficulty arises in deciding which municipal functions
fall into the class of governmental and which iito that of corporate or proprietary. Illinois has held consistently that the exercise of the police power is a governmental function 4 and has
in one case given the police power such a broad definition that
there is little left of city functions that would not be covered by
the definition. That case, Evans v. City of Kankakee,5 defines
police power or regulations as including "the making and enforcement of all such laws, ordinances and regulations as pertain
to the comfort, safety, health, convenience, good order and welfare of the public." Fortunately, in the decided cases, the Illinois courts have not followed the definition to its full extent. In
fact, they have restricted the functions falling into the class of
governmental.
In the ease of Johnston v. City of Chicago,6 the city was held
liable for the negligence of a driver of an automobile who was
hired by the secretary of the public library board and who at the
time of the accident was driving an automobile owned by the
public library, conveying books from one library building to another along the streets of the city. The court held the ownership
and operation of a municipal library to be a proprietary or corporate function, even though it was for the comfort, convenience,
and welfare of the public. The case of Gebhardt v. Village of
La Grange Park,T in holding that the maintenance of a swimming pool is a governmental function, is out of line with the
general trend of the Illinois cases. This case can be reconciled
only on the ground, hinted by the court there, that the use of
the pool was not limited only to the inhabitants of the village
but could be used by outsiders. The reasoning in the case cannot be reconciled; for by it the proprietary functions would be
restricted to those in the nature of a corporate business or undertaking for profit. The Illinois cases do not support this reasoning.
In the case of Bedtke v. City of Chicago," the city was held
liable for the negligence of its servants in the use of a portable
incinerator in an alley back of plaintiff's premises which caused
the destruction by fire of certain personal property of the plaintiff; and in the case of Roumbos, Admr. v. City of Chicago9 the
city was held liable for the death of a child which was caused
4 Blake v. City of Pontiac, 49 Il1. App. 543 (1893) ; City of Chicago v. Selz,
Schwab & Co., 202 Ill. 545, 67 N. E. 386 (1903) ; City of Chicago v. Williams,
182 IIl. 135, 55 N. E. 123 (1899) ; Clarke v. City of Chicago, 159 Ill, App. 20
(1910); Culver v. City of Streator, 130 111. 238, 22 N. E. 810 (1889) ; Evans
v. City of Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223 (1907).
5231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223 (1907).
6258 11. 494, 101 N. E. 960 (1913).
7 354 IM. 234, 188 N. E. 372 (1933).
8 240 IM. App. 493 (1926).
9332 Ill. 70, 163 N. E. 361 (1928).
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by its clothing having been ignited by a fire set by a street
cleaner to a pile of rubbish,* the street cleaner having left the
fire burning without watching it. The last two cases held that
the cleaning of streets is a proprietary function of the city and
that the city is liable for the torts of its servants acting in that
capacity. It is not a long step from the decisions in these street
cleaning cases to the case here considered. Street cleaning certainly pertains to the comfort, convenience, health and welfare
of the public and the removal of refuse and garbage does also,
possibly to a greater degree because of the danger to public
health that might be caused thereby.
Several other jurisdictions in this country are in accord with
Illinois on these holdings. The Federal courts1 ° and Texas11 hold
that the removal
of waste and garbage is a proprietary function.
Mississippi 12 and New York'8 hold that street cleaning is a proprietary function. But the decisions in the majority of jurisdictions are contrary to those of Illinois, and maintain that the
removal of refuse and garbage is a governmental function because it is for the benefit of the health of the entire public, within
and without the municipality. The states in this group are
17
Alabama, 14 California, 15 Georgia, 16 Kentucky,
Massachusetts, 62
21
20
Missouri, 19 New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 2
23
North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, 24 Tennessee, 25 Virginia, 26 and
Wisconsin. 27
The Illinois courts are restricting the acts that will be classed
as governmental functions and classifying more and more of
them in the class of proprietary functions in order to restrict the
cases where the city might escape liability for the torts of its
servants. Illinois is extending the doctrine of respondeat superior
10 Denver v. Porter, 126 F. 288 (1903).
11Ostrom v. San Antonio, 94 Tex. 523, 62 S. W. 909 (1901).
12 Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 100 Miss. 76, 56 So. 329 (1911).
13 Silverman v. New York, 114 N. Y. S. 59 (1909); Quill v. New York, 55
N. Y. S. 889 (1899).
14 City of Tuscaloosa v. Fitts, 209 Ala. 635, 96 So. 771 (1923).
15 Manning v. City of Pasadena, 58 Cal. App. 666, 209 P. 253 (1922).
16 Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129, 22 S. E. 29 (1894).
'T City of Louisville v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S. W. 165 (1914); City
of Harlan v. Peaveley et al., 224 Ky. 338, 6 S. W. (2d) 270 (1928).
18 Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 77 N. E. 888 (1906).
19 Behrmann v. City of St. Louis, 273 Mo. 578, 201 S. W. 547 (1918).
20 Connor v. City of Manchester, 73 N. H. 233, 60 A. 436 (1905).,
21 Condict v. Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. 157 (1884).
22 James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922).
23 Montain v. City of Fargo, 38 N. D. 432, 166 N. W. 416 (1917) ; Moulton
v. City of Fargo, 39 N. D. 502, 167 N. W. 717 (1918).
24 Scibilia v. City of Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 A. 273 (1924) ; Bandos
et al. v. City of Philadelphia, 304 Pa. 191, 155 A. 279 (1931).
25 City of Nashville v. Mason, 137 Tenn. 169, 192 S. W. 915 (1917).
2
6Asbbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 147 S. E. 223 (1929).
27 Bruhnke v. City of La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485, 144 N. W. 1100 (1914).
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in the case of municipalities and is adopting or at least beginning
to favor the idea advocated in 34 Harvard Law Review on page
66, that the distinction between governmental and private or
proprietary functions in determining the tort liability of the
municipal corporations for negligence in affirmative conduct be
abandoned: that the doctrine of respondeat superior be applied
to the city as well as to another, and that injuries caused by
municipal employees be considered proper items to be borne by
the community in place of the innocent injured person. The idea
has been given further impetus by the enactment in 1931 by the
Illinois legislature of laws making the municipality liable for
the torts of its firemen. 28 The extension of the liability of municipalities for the torts of their employees may point to a new trend
in the branch of the law relating to municipal corporations.
J. BOUCEK
LIABILITy OF SUCCESSIVE INSURERS OF EMPLOYER'S LIAnirY IN

The highest court of Massachusetts was recently faced with an unusual situation in Donahue's Case,' in connection with liability under the state Workmen's Compensation Act. The claimant in the case had worked
as a weaver for the employer for nearly seventeen years, making
asbestos brake lining, after which time he was forced to stop
work because of pneumonoconiosis, a disease of the lungs,
bivught about by the inhalation of the asbestos dust. During the
period of his employment and while he was continuously exposed
to the dust, the employer had been insured successively by three
different insurance companies. The Industrial Accident Board
ruled that the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company was
the only one of the three liable to pay the compensation, on the
ground that the personal injury occurred at the time of its coverage, on the date the claimant left work. The insurance company appealed, contending that as each of the insurers covered
the employer at a time while the bodily condition was affected,
each should bear a proportionate share, rather than that the last
one be held liable for the cumulative effects.
The court affirmed the decision of the commission, basing its
ruling on a construction of several provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The court's premises are correct, but it is
suggested that the conclusion arrived at was erroneous. It is quite
true that "in these cases, where the cause operates through a
period of years, the liability of any particular insurer depends
upon whether or not it is found that the 'personal injury' took
place during the time specified as the period of coverage in the
28 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933). Ch. 70. par. 9.
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES. -

1 195 N. E. 345 (1935).
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contract between that insurer and the employer.' '2 But to hold
that the injury did not occur until the time the claimant was
unable to continue work, seems illogical in view of the known
nature of the disease.
The only other case directly in point appears to be that of
Plecity v. George McLachlan Hat Company, in Connecticut.3 In
that case the court came to the diametrically opposite conclusion
that each successive insurer during the time of the growth of the
disease was liable for the whole amount of compensation to the
employee. The court felt that it would be an undue burden on
the injured person to compel him to prove the exact extent of
contribution due from each insurer, and said that matter could
be settled among themselves.
The Massachusetts court dismissed the Plecity case with a
wave of the hand, saying, ". . . it is unnecessary to discuss
Plecity v. George McLachlan Hat Company . .. relied upon by
the appellant. That case was decided under a statute and practice which differ from ours." 4 As a matter of fact, the basis of
the Connecticut decision was not simply a statute, but a reasoned
logical conclusion from all the facts and circumstances.
No case has arisen in Illinois on this subject. The law in this
state is still extremely unsettled as to occupational diseases and
their place under the Workmen's Compensation Act. But one
decision may have a far-reaching effect.
In Belleville Enameling and Stamping Company v. United
States Casualty Company,5 decided in 1932, the court in Illinois
held that a workman's compensation and employer's liability
policy does not cover liability of an employer to employees for
the contraction of silicosis, an occupational disease, when the
policy does not contain any reference to an injury caused otherwise than by accident, and one of the provisions of the policy is
that it shall apply only to injuries "sustained by reason of accidents occurring during the policy period." That has a bearing
on the question here involved, because in the Plecity case in
Connecticut, the provision in the policy was exactly the same, yet
the court held that the mercurial poisoning of the claimant came
within those terms, and that each insurer was liable to the claimant for the entire amount of compensation awarded, there being
no words of apportionment in the policy.
If the obligation of the insurer under a liability contract becomes fixed when liability attaches to the insured, e when does
liability so attach in the case of the gradual growth and develop2 Ibid.

8 116 Conn. 216, 164 A. 707 (1933).
4 195 N. E. 345 (1935).
5266
111.
App. 586 (1932).
6
Zieman v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 238 N. W. 100 (Iowa, 1931).
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ment of the abnormal bodily condition which eventually incapacitates the employee? Is it only at the moment when the
employee is overcome and forced to leave his employment, or is
it during the entire term? Since it is impossible to ascertain
definitely just when the disease was contracted, it seems more
logical to hold liable all employers whose employment contributed
to the injurious condition. Then it would follow that each successive insurer would be liable for the entire amount of compensation awarded, although there could be only one satisfaction, and the question of contribution would be determined
among them.
HELEN W. MUNSERT
CERTIFIED

CHECK

NOT

PREFERRED

CLAIM

AGAINST

CLOSED

BANK IN HANDS OF RECEIVER.-In People ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Trust and Savings Bank, Patrick DeMichelc, Intervening
Petitioner,' the court held that the certification of a check by a
bank before it closed did not amount to the creation of a trust
fund to the amount of the check. The intervening petitioner in
that case was the holder of two checks drawn on the Lincoln
Trust and Savings Bank, one in the amount of $10,000 and the
other in the amount of $1,870, both of which checks were certified
by the bank before it closed its doors on April 15, 1931. It was
also found by the master that the bank had made out a debit slip,
which was marked paid, and which was delivered to the depositor
before the bank closed. The plaintiff contended that these facts
were sufficient to establish the creation of a trust fund in his
favor to the amount of $11,870, and sought to have this amount
allowed against the bank as a preferred claim.
The court disallowed the claim, saying that it was "already
committed to the opinion that the holder of a certified check under
similar circumstances as above is not entitled to a preferred
claim." In support of this statement the court cited two Illinois
cases, both of them appellate court decisions, People ex rel. Nelson v. Builders and Merchants Bank,2 and Clark v. Chicago Title
and Trust Company.8 Both of these cases involved a cashier's
check instead of a certified check, but the Supreme Court said in
the Clark case, in affirming the decision of the Appellate Court:
"The drawing of the cashier's check, even if it changed the form
of indebtedness, did not change the fact. The Globe Savings Bank
was still indebted to the appellant for the $3,000 represented by
its cashier's check. There was no change in the nature of the
debt. The only change was in the evidence of it." The. court
then added that, in legal effect, a cashier's check is the same as a
1279 Ill. App. 18 (1935).
2 264 I. App. 388 (1932).
8 85 111. App. 293 (1899).
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certified check. The Builders and Merchants Bank case was taken
to the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari and the petition
Court felt that the Supreme
was denied ;4 therefore the Appellate
5
Court had affirmed its decision.
A noteworthy remark, though purely dictum, made by the
court in the principal case, was as follows: "It should be noted
that these claims arose before the Act of 1931 went into effect on
July 8, 1931, wherein it is provided that under the circumstances
above narrated the holder of a certified check is entitled to a preferred claim.' '6 This act seems definitely to settle the question in
this state as far as future cases are concerned and establishes a
rule of law which has been the subject of conflict in judicial
decisions.7 Apparently no cases have as yet arisen in which the
statute has been applied, but the wording of the act seems
so clear and definite that no doubt can exist as to the stand which
the courts must take.
G. E. HALL
ULTRA VIRES--MODERN TENDENCY TO RESTRICT THE DEF ENsE.-

That ultra vires as a defense is rapidly losing its potency is becoming increasingly evident from recent judicial expressions.
4186 Ill. 440 (1900).
5 On this question of the effect of quashing or dismissing a petition for a
writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court there seems to be a conflict of opinion.
In the early case of McConnel v. Swailes, 2 Scam. 571 (1810), the court said
as to this point: "This court does not entertain a doubt, but that the dismissal
of an appeal, or certiorari, is equivalent to a regular, technical affirmance of
the judgment ..
" This case was cited on the same point in Sutherland v.
Phelps, 22 Ill. 92 (1859). In a recent Federal case, however, the court refused
to consider the denial of certiorari by the Illinois Supreme Court as an expression of that court on the particular point there involved. The Federal case was
White-Phillips Co., Inc. v. Graham, 74 F. (2d) 417 (1934).
The United States courts have held, however, that a denial of certiorari by
the state supreme court is an affirmance of the decision of the appellate court
for purposes of review by the Federal Courts under the statute which requires
the party to proceed as far as possible in the state courts before appealing to
the Federal courts. In Dodd and Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure, this
statement is made in regard to the writ: "The only matter to be determined on
review by certiorari is whether or not the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction, or
whether it exceeded its jurisdiction, or otherwise proceeded in violation of law.
These issues cannot be tried on allegations contained in the petition for the
writ or on any facts except on the record of the proceedings as returned." The
case cited in support of this statement is Hine v. Roberts, 309 Ill. 439 (1923).
It should also be noted that the granting or denying of the writ is discretionary
with the Supreme Court and the fact that it is denied may merely be because
the decision of the Appellate Court was not an abuse of its powers, even though
the Supreme Court might have decided the issues differently. Hence, it seems
that while the denial of certiorari is an affirmance of the Appellate Court's
decision for some purposes, it is not the same as a Supreme Court decision
on the point, and does not have quite as much weight as a Supreme Court
decision so far as the doctrine of stare decisis is concerned.
6Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931), Ch. 16a, par. 37.
T
In re Jayne and Mason, 251 N. Y. S. 768 (1931).
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The recent Illinois Appellate Court case of Warner et al. v. Munson et al." is a good example of the trend of modern decisions.
In that case a bill was filed to foreclose a trust deed on real estate
given to secure a "bearer" promissory note executed by the defendants as mortgagors. The defense interposed was ultra vires.
The evidence disclosed that the plaintiffs' assignor was a construction company which had purchased the note and trust deed
with surplus funds as a temporary investment. The court in
sustaining the plaintiffs' right to foreclose made the following
statement:
"The Svithiod2 and Royal Drug Company3 cases. . . and the
decisions cited and referred to therein, as well as text writers and
authorities in other states, are tending to uphold and enforce
partly executed contracts, fairly made, where 'the public policy
of justice overbalances the public policy of keeping the corporation within the limits of its charter,' 4 unless expressly prohibited
by statute."
The latter exception was recognized in the recent case of Pattison v. The Illinois Bankers Life Association et al.,5 which was a
suit to recover a payment due under the provisions of an insurance contract. Although the contract had been fully performed
by the plaintiff and the defendant corporation had received the
full benefit of that performance the court denied a recovery,
stating that the type of insurance contract which was the basis
of the suit was prohibited by the statute under which the defendant corporation was organized, and hence the power to make
such contract was "entirely wanting" and it "could not be given
vitality by the acts of the parties under it."
Further indicative of the modern trend is the statement found
in the case of Royal Drug Company v. Levin 6 where the court,
in disallowing the defense of ultra vires to an action by a corporation on a promissory note, said: "As indicating the modern
trend with reference to this question, it should be noted that at
the last session of the General Assembly of this State an act was
passed, effective July 1, 1933, which in effect wipes out the defense of ultra vires in such a case as is now before us. "T
How the newly-enacted Business Corporation Act will affect
the principles laid down in the cases of Warner et al. v. Munson
et al. and Pattisonv. The Illinois Bankers Life Association et al.,
1280 111. App. 484 (1935).
2
Independent Order of Svithiod v. Ring Lodge No. 8, 261 Ill.App. 289

(1931).
8 Royal Drug Company v. Levin, 273 Iil. App. 231 (1934).
4 Benson Lumber Company v. Thornton, 185 Minn. 230, 240 N. W. 651
(1932).
5360 111. 616, 196 N. E. 882 (1935).
6273 Il1. App. 231 (1934).
7 Cahill's Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 32, par. 8.
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which were decided under the law as it existed prior to the adoption of the new act, is still uncertain. However, the former case
does not in anywise conflict with the Act and the result reached
works justice to both parties; but the latter case seems to sacrifice the "public policy of justice" upon the public policy of keeping the corporation within its powers. It is cases of the latter
type which are more apt to be affected by the new act.
L. G. RICHMAN
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT TO REVIVE MUNICIPAL JUDG-

MENT, TRANSCRIPT OF WHICH HAS BEEN FILED.-The recent Illi-

nois Appellate Court case of Van Home v. Harford' holds that
a judgment obtained in a city court may be revived only in that
court, and not in the circuit court, even though a transcript has
been filed in the circuit court. Although this is the general
weight of authority, 2 the case is practically one of first impression in this state. The point was raised indirectly by the Illinois
Supreme Court in 1875 in Chaflenor v. Niles,3 in which the court
held that in scire facias to revive a judgment, or upon a matter
of record, the circuit court has jurisdiction to send its process
to any county where the defendant may be found. In support
of its decision the court said that it was "aware of no practice
that would authorize a writ of scire facias to issue to revive a
judgment from a county other than that in which the judgment
was rendered, and if the writ could not be sent for service to
another county, in many cases the object of the writ would be
defeated."
It is interesting to note that the Appellate Court, in the principal case, cites Corpus Juris in support of its decision, although
the decision would actually fall into an apparent exception and
qualification given in Corpus Juris. The language there in point
follows: "A proceeding to revive a judgment must be brought
in the court and county wherein it was rendered. The rule applies even where, under statutory authority, a transcript of the
judgment is filed in a court of another county, or where a
transcript of a judgment of a federal court is filed in a state
court, unless the statute providing for the transfer authorizes a
revivor in the court to which the transfer is made; but in the
case of judgments of justices or other inferior courts removed
by transcript to a superior court, jurisdiction to revive the judgment resides in the latter court. "4
1280 I1. App. 576 (1935).
2 Thompson v. Parker, 83 Ind. 96 (1882); McRoberts v. Lyon, 79 Mich.
25, 44 N. W. 160 (1889); Bank v. Moore, 98 Neb. 843, 154 N. W. 731 (1915) ;
Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Edmisten, 85 Neb. 272, 122 N. W. 891 (1909).
878 1. 78 (1875).
4 34 C. J. 664, sec. 1021.
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Inasmuch as the court in question, the City Court of Alton,
is an inferior court, as determined elsewhere by judicial decision, 5 the present case, as stated, would seem to fall within the
exception. However, upon investigation it will be found that the
cases cited in support of the apparent exception limit its application to those cases where by statute the judgment of the inferior
court, upon its being filed in the superior court, shall have the
same force and effect as a judgment of the latter court.6 This
restriction in effect destroys the exception, inasmuch as the
power conferred by such a provision necessarily includes the
power of revival.
The Illinois statute relating to judgments and decrees of a
city court provides that "such judgments and decrees shall be
liens upon the real estate in such city from the time of their
rendition, and in the county wherein such city court is situate,
after a certified transcript of the same shall have been filed in
the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the said county."
Clearly, the effect of this statute is merely to render the judgment a lien upon realty, or upon additional realty, and not to
give the judgment standing in the superior court itself.
Inasmuch as this is the general rule, sanctioned alike by commentators and authorities, the law of the principal case will
doubtless be followed by the Supreme Court if the question is
raised there.
G. S. STANSELL
NECESSITY OF ASSIGNING CRoss-ERRoRs.-The Illinois Appellate
Court in its recent decision in the case of McNulty v. Hotel Sherman Company' has determined that the necessity for assigning
cross-errors is the same under the Civil Practice Act 2 as it was
under the Practice Act of 1907. The plaintiff recovered a verdict
of $4,000 for personal injuries. The defendant moved for a new
trial, which motion the court allowed after the plaintiff had declined to remit $2,000 from the amount of the verdict. The plaintiff appealed from the order granting a new trial and the defendant failed to indicate its intention of cross-appeal. The question presented was whether the defendant's failure to prosecute
a cross-appeal precluded it from urging every ground and excep5 The People v. Municipal Court, 359 Ill. 102, 194 N. E. 242 (1935). For a
discussion of this case, see 13 CHICAGo-KENT REVIEw 273. Also, Reid v. Mor.
ton, 119 Ill. 118, 6 N. E. 414 (1886) ; Wolf v. Hope, 210 Ill. 50, 70 N. E. 1082
(1904).
6 Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Edmisten, 85 Neb. 272, 122 N. W. 891
(1909) ; Guffy v. Nelson, 131 Pa. St. 273, 18 A. 1073 (1890) ; Smith v. Wehrly.
157 Pa. St. 407, 27 A. 700 (1893).
7 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1915), Ch. 37, par. 379.
'280 Ill. App. 325 (1935).
2 355 Ill.
34, 35, Rule 35 (1) and (2) (1934).
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tion in the record entitling it to a new trial: that is, whether the
appellee was limited to questioning only the excessiveness of the
damages as required by the remittitur.
In Pelouze v. Slaughter,3 decided under the Practice Act of
1907, the court reviewed the question of cross-appeals very thoroughly. There it was said, "In general, the cases holding a party
can only protect his right by assigning cross-errors have been
where the decree or judgment did not give the party all the
relief that he claimed or gave to his adversary more than he was
considered entitled to, and where the appellee or defendant in
error might have taken an appeal or prosecuted a writ of error. "4
If a party has not obtained all that he deems himself entitled
to, he may appeal; but not where he gets all that he claims.5
The statutory assignment of cross-errors is only required where
a party seeks a reversal of a decree or6 judgment and might have
appealed or sued out a writ of error.
In the McNulty case it was sufficient that the defendant controverted the plaintiff's assignment of errors, and having prevailed over them, the case was rightly remanded for an entire
new trial. As the plaintiff had not accepted the order of
remittitur, the remanding for a new trial was all that the defendant could claim. It follows that the defendant, not being
in any way aggrieved by the court's order or any part thereof,
could not have appealed or sued out a writ of error and therefore would not have been required to assign cross-errors under
the Act of 1907. Since Rule 35 of the Supreme Court Rules takes
the place of section 107 of the Practice Act of 1907, the defendant is not required to prosecute a cross-appeal from a motion
granting a new trial.
The reason stated in the order for granting a new trial is not
controlling, and when the whole record is brought up on appeal,
the defendant should be allowed to urge any ground upon which
he relied in the lower court to sustain the order or judgment. He
need not file a cross-appeal in order to have considered all
grounds upon which he relied in the trial court to obtain a new
trial.
J. D. GANNON

AS

RATIFICATION OF DELIVERY OF CHECK TO UNAUTHORIZED AGENT
INCLUDING RATIFICATION OF FORGED SIGNATURE OF PRIN-

Ubowich v. Northern Trust Company,' the
plaintiff, as unknown heir of Charles Ubowich, was entitled to
CIPAL.-In the case of

3241 IMl.215 (1909). --4 Ibid., p. 225, and cases there cited.
5
Gray v. Jones, 178 IH. 169 (1899).
6241 Ill. 226 (1909).
1281 Il1. App. 109 (1935).
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$1,000. This sum had been deposited by order of the probate
court with the county treasurer. Subsequently, an unknown person petitioned the county treasurer for the payment of the sum.
Whether the party acted as the plaintiff, Alex M. Ubowich, or as
his agent, is unknown. Pursuant to the petition, the county
treasurer issued a check to Alex M. Ubowich, and delivered it
to the unknown person. The check was then taken by this person
and indorsed to the defendant bank with the indorsement of
Alex M. Ubowich and F. F. Roberts. The money was paid to this
person as F. F. Roberts, and he subsequently disappeared. Plaintiff, Alex Ubowich, now brings his suit against the bank for the
conversion of this check.
The defense of the bank was that the plaintiff had no title
to the check as there had been no delivery; that plaintiff could
not ratify this delivery without ratifying the forgery; that he
was therefore barred from bringing an action for conversion. To
meet this, the plaintiff claimed that by bringing his suit, he
ratified the delivery of the check by the county treasurer to the
unknown person as his agent and nothing more. The court held
that the plaintiff might ratify the delivery of the check without
ratifying the forgery. To sustain this, two questions seem to be
involved: Was this a delivery capable of ratification? Was this
delivery connected with the subsequent forgery?
Delivery means transfer of possession from one person to another. There must exist an intention to deliver and an act of
delivering, either actual or constructive.2 When the county
treasurer drew this check, he drew it solely for Alex M. Ubowich.
F. F. Roberts received the check as the check of Alex Ubowich.
Here, then, is an act and an intention to deliver. That would
be sufficient if Roberts could be connected with the plaintiff as
an agent. There was no evidence as to what Roberts said or did,
but it was known that the check was issued as the property of
the plaintiff, and that the defendant bank, when taking the check,
took it as the check of the plaintiff. Thus, there is an unauthorized person acting either as the plaintiff or for him, and holding
in his hands at all times the check made out to the plaintiff. At
any time up to the indorsement of the check, the plaintiff could
have ratified this act and received the check.3 It was at this
point, then, that the real ratification took place; and it cannot be
said that it was in any manner connected with the subsequent
forgery. The plaintiff by ratifying the act of Roberts merely
approved the delivery of the check to him. Roberts stood as an
agent holding a check of his principal when he took the check to
28 C. J. 203.
3 Crowell v. Osborne, 43 N. J. L. 335 (1881); Meeker v. Shanks, 112 Ind.
207, 13 N. E. 712 (1887) ; Pickle v. People's National Bank, 88 Tenn. 380, 12
S. W. 919 (1890).
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the bank. The defendant bank received the check as belonging
to the plaintiff, principal, and not to Roberts, and it took it only
through a forgery.
The court approved an opinion in a Tennessee case wherein
Judge Lurton said: \ "The effect of this ratification is simply to
make the check the property of the complainant. It does not
ratify the collection of the check by one whose act in receiving
it is subsequently ratified, and agency to receive a check payable
to order implies no authority to indorse it in the name of the
payee, or to collect without such indorsement. "4
It is clear that the bank could not take the check of the plaintiff without his indorsement. Its acts in receiving it, paying the
proceeds to Roberts, and refusing to return the check to plaintiff,
constituted a conversion of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff
recovers, not upon the theory of a delivery to the bank, but on
the theory that the check was delivered to him through his agent
and subsequently to the bank, which now holds it only through
a forgery and is therefore bound to return it or its value.
R. L. HUFF
DuE
Illinois Appellate Court decision, the use of the land trust as a practical device to avoid the complications arising from co-ownership
of land, has been encouraged. In the case of Brazowski v. Chicago Title and Trust Company,' the court discussed such trusts
and held that a trustee thereunder, who merely holds the legal
title and who is not in fact in occupancy or control, is not liable
for torts occurring by reason of the defective condition of the
trust property. In order to hold a trustee liable for such torts he
must not only have such legal title, but he must have possession
of the premises, either actually or constructively, and must have
control. Possession as here used means more than occupancy;
it means the management of the premises.
In the case under discussion, property in Chicago was owned
by four men as tenants in common, and they executed a declaration of trust designating the Chicago Title and Trust Company
as trustee to hold the title for the benefit of the settlors. By the
instrument of trust the beneficiaries had the power of direction
to deal with title to the property, the right to rentals or proceeds from sale, the entire management and control of the property, and the renting, selling and handling thereof. But it specifically provided that as far as the public was concerned the
trustee had full power to deal with the property. For a time the
LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE UNDER LAND TRUST FOR INJURIES
TO CONDITION OF TRUST PROPERTY.-As a result of a recent

4 Pickle v. Peoples National Bank, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. 919 (1890).

1280 II. App. 293 (1935).
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trust company made leases and collected the rents, but after a
few years it turned the balance over to the beneficiaries who continued in full control. The plaintiff, an infant, was injured by
the collapse of a fence on the trust property, and he sued the
trust company, claiming that the trustee was in possession
through its agents, the beneficiaries, and therefore liable for the
tort. He also claimed that the provisions of the trust deed were
inconsistent and repugnant, in that as to the public the trustee
had full control, but the beneficiaries were also given full control.
The court held that the beneficiaries had vested the trustee
with the legal title, and at the same time reserved to themselves
the management and control, and therefore the powers of the
beneficiaries were not derived from the trustee but created by
themselves as principals. For that reason the beneficiaries were
not the agents of the trustee in collecting the rents and maintaining the premises, but were exercising those powers in their own
rights. It was only as to the public, and to protect persons acquiring rights in the property by dealing with the trustee that
the trustee was to be considered sole owner.
This type of instrument is not uncommon. In Gallagher and
Speck v. Chicago Title and Trust Company,2 a similar trust deed
was considered and the court held that there was no relation of
principal and agent created between the grantee as trustee and
the beneficiary named in the instrument. In Whittaker v. Central Trust Company,3 the trustee was held not liable for personal
injuries on the ground that it did not have the possession and
control over the property where the trust deed provided management and direction were to be vested in the beneficiaries.
The Illinois law is in accord with that in other jurisdictions.
To render the trustee liable for torts, he must have more than
the mere legal title, and it is immaterial whether the trust is
created by deed or by will. In Eisenbrey v. Pennsylvania Company for Insurance,4 property was devised to trustees, but a certain part of it, on which an injury occurred, was directed to be
occupied and kept in repair by a sister of the deceased. The court
held that the company, being a mere trustee, not in the occupancy of the premises even by a tenant, and exercising no
control whatever over it, could not be held responsible because
there was no room for the doctrine of respondeat superior. A
New York case decided just a few years later held that executors
to whom the legal title of the testator's realty was devised, were
not liable for injuries caused by the defective condition of the
premises, the use whereof was given to another, and of which
the executors were not given the duty to repair, because the duty
2238 M1.App. 39 (1925).

8270 m. App. 614 (1933).

4 141 Pa. St. 566, 21 A. 639 (1891).
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of keeping premises in safe condition in general pertains to
occupancy and not ownership.5 The theme running through all
these tort liability cases is that unless the holder of the legal
title is in possession or control of the premises, there is no duty
imposed on such holder to keep the premises in repair, and he
is therefore not liable for injuries occurring on them.
The primary feature of the land trust as used to prevent the
disabilities of ownership by tenants in common, is that legal title
is placed in a trustee for the benefit of the cotenants, who are the
cestuis as well as the settlors. By this method, the questions of
descent of property and dower interests arising by the death of
the cotenant are avoided. The powers of the trustee are broad
in that third persons have a right to deal with him as the true
owner in the fullest sense. But as between the trustee and the
beneficiaries, the latter have the entire management and control of the property by .virtue of their own declaration in the
trust deed, and can in no sense be agents of the trustee. Since
the beneficiaries were in possession of the premises as principals,
the trustee cannot be held for failure to repair, and the trust
companies are relieved from responsibilities which might hitherto
have been a deterrent to the formation of such trusts.
HELEN W. MUNSERT

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF PAROL PROMISE TO CONVEY

INTER-

LAND.-Fierke v. Elgin City Banking Company,1 recently
decided on demurrer by the Supreme Court of Illinois, furnishes
a test for the establishment of the law with respect to the specific
performance of parol promises to convey land. John Fierke,
the uncle of the complainant, seventy-two years of age and in
failing health, living alone in the old family dwelling house after
the death of his wife, promised his nephew, the complainant, that
if he and his wife would give up their home, become members of
his family, and assume the management of the establishment during the remainder of his life, he would, in consideration therefor,
at his death, leave him the residence property and its contents
in fee simple, 1,300 shares of stock in three corporations, and
$10,000 in-money. The complainant alleged that in reliance upon
the promise he and his wife gave up their home, moved with his
uncle, and fully performed their part of the agreement; and
that they had performed many arduous duties, as a result of
which they suffered impaired health. The uncle did provide for
the complainant in his will, but not to the extent of his promise.
In this action for specific performance, the court said, "The
allegations taken as true, which under demurrer must be taken
EST IN

5 Butler v. Townsend, 84 Hun 100, 31 N. Y. S. 1094 (1895).

1359 Ill.
394, 194 N. E. 528 (1935).
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as true ... sufficiently show that by reason of the contract the
complainant made a change by which he suffered substantial
detriment, financially and physically .... The allegations taken
as true, show that an abrogation of the contract would amount to
a fraud on the complainant and sufficient to take the case out
of the Statute of Frauds."
A great deal of confusion seems to have arisen from the improper use of the expression that part performance takes the
case out of the Statute of Frauds. As a matter of fact, the
Statute, in dealing with part performance, has reference only
to the sale of chattels. It is indeed unfortunate that this phrase
has become ingrained in opinions concerning parol promises
involving interests in land. Not only is it misleading, but it is
not strictly true that part performance will take the case out of
the Statute. By the weight of authority, where the purchaser
has paid part, or even all of the purchase price, he is not entitled
to specific performance. There must be something more than
the performance of his promise. Where the purchase price is
paid in money, the injured party can be made whole again by
the return of the purchase money with interest. It is not, then,
performance that takes the contract out of the Statute-it is the
fact that the promisee has suffered a substantial detriment in
his change of position in reliance on the contract, so that the
promisor's failure to perform would amount to a fraud on the
complainant.
In the Illinois case of Snyder v. French,2 where the deceased
had promised that if the complainant's parents would allow him
and his wife to take the complainant, then an infant, and raise
her as their own, they would on their death leave her all their
property, and the complainant, who had been so raised, upon
the death of the promisor intestate brought an action against
the heirs for specific performance, the court denied relief upon
the ground that the complainant had not shown that her condition was worse than it would have been had she continued to
live with her natural parents. The court placed its decision on
the theory of a change of position, which seems to be the true
basis for decreeing specific performance in such cases.
In Adkins v. Adkins,3 it was held that inorder to take an oral
promise that has been partly performed out of the Statute of
Frauds, the part performance must be such that it would constitute a fraud not to compel the agreement to be fully performed. Although the courts are fairly agreed that the acts must
amount to an equitable estoppel, there is a great divergence of
opinion as to what constitutes such an estoppel. In Adkins v.
Adkins, the plaintiff spent several years caring for his father
2272 IM.43, Ill N. E. 489 (1916).
8 332 IU.422, 163 N. E. 823 (1928).
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and mother and tending the farm, put improvements on the
land, and paid taxes, doctor bills, and funeral expenses for his
parents. In that case, it was held that denial of specific performance would not amount to a fraud on the plaintiff. In the
same jurisdiction, it was held in the principal case that the plaintiff, by spending three years in the elaborate home of his uncle
with a retinue of servants, had been put in such a position that
not to grant specific performance would be to permit the promisor to perpetrate a fraud upon him. It seems only just, however,
where one party, in reliance on the oral promise of another, has
put himself in such a position that he cannot be returned to
status quo, that the other party should not be permitted to set
up the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
Some courts have held that as a condition precedent to securing specific performance, the plaintiff must have had such possession of the property
as would point to the existence of a con4
tract to convey.
In Illinois, the possession seems to be a question of evidence
which goes to prove the existence of the contract rather than an
element that must be present before specific performance will be
decreed. In Aldrich v. Aldrich,5 it was held by the Supreme
Court of Illinois that to establish an oral contract to convey, it
was not essential to show that the son took exclusive possession
and made permanent improvements, where the father lived on
the land with his son, who was not to have exclusive possession
until the father's death. In the principal case, the contract being
admitted, it was not necessary for the court to touch on the character of the possession in arriving at their decision.
W. R. MACMILLAN
RIGHT TO PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE

POLICY

UPON MORTGAGED

PROPERTY AFTER REPAIRS HAVE BEEN MADE.-In the recent case
of Koscher v. Chicago City Bank and Trust Company,' the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held, where a fire loss
had occurred to mortgaged premises in default, and where the
trust deed contained the usual clause requiring the mortgagor to
secure the proper fire insurance, and the insurance check had been
made payable jointly to the mortgagor, the mortgagee, and the
contractor who made the repairs, that the mortgagee was entitled
to the money to apply against his deficiency decree obtained subsequent to the damage and repairs.
The equity owner filed the original bill, asking for the proceeds
of the check to be turned over to the contractor; the mortgagee
4 Dexter v. Winslow et al., 254 Mass. 407, 150 N. E. 158 (1926) ; Burns v.
McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922).
5287 I1. 213, 122 N. E. 472 (1919).
1280 IM. App. 500 (1935).
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filed a cross-bill to foreclose and asked for application of the
insurance proceeds on the deficiency; and the contractor lien
claimant intervened. The master found for the foreclosing mortgagee; the chancellor held for the equity holder; and the Appellate Court reversed, and sustained the finding of the master.
In so doing, the court first decided that under the trust deed, even
if the trustee had not been named as one of the beneficiaries under the policy, the mortgagee would have an equitable lien upon
the proceeds. 2 Although the court cited foreign cases, 3 there
are many Illinois decisions which hold this to be the law. 4 In
all these cases, however, the properties had not been repaired.
The problem of determining who is entitled-to the insurance
money when repairs have been made remains. Is the mortgagee
to have the security of the property in the condition which he
bargained for and in addition the cash proceeds of the insurance?
First of all, the law is clear that the intervening contractor
could under no circumstances be entitled to the fund directly, for
it has been decided in this state that a stranger to the insurance
contract, in the absence of any other contract to secure the insurance for his benefit, can have no claim upon it. 5
It has been held in other states that when repairs are made the
mortgagee ceases to have a lien on the proceeds of insurance."
The court, however, stressed the defaults under the terms of the
trust deed, thus leaving some doubt as to the result if there had
been no defaults. It seems clear enough that if in the absence
of default repairs were made, there would be nothing due the
mortgagee. In Palmer Savings Bank v. Insurance Company of
North America,7 cited in support of the decision, the court
avoided the apparent inequities with the reasoning that the price
paid at the foreclosure sale was higher than it would have been
if the repairs had not been made, and accordingly the owner was
not harmed; that the legal situation was the same as if the sum
had been paid to the owner.
2 Thomas v. Vonkapff, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 372 (1834); note to 3 Kent Com.
376; Angel, Fire and Life Insurance, sec. 62; 2 Am. Leading Cas. 834, 5th
ed.; Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R. I. 491 (1858); Wheeler v. Factors' & Traders' Ins.
Co., 101 U. S. 439, 25 L. Ed. 1055 (1880).
a Juneau County State Bank v. Steckling, 181 Wis. 430, 195 N. W. 396
(1923); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co., 186 U. S.
434, 46 L. Ed. 1234 (1902); Butson v. Misz, 81 Ore. 607, 160 P. 530 (1916).
4 Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assurance Co., 118 Ill. 396, 9 N. E. 274 (1886) ;
Norwich Fire Ins. Co. v. Boomer, 52 Ill. 442 (1869); Wilson v. Hakes, 36 Ill.
App. 539 (1890).
5 Lindley v. Orr, 83 Ill. App. 70 (1898).
6 Huey v. Ewell, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 638, 55 S. W. 606 (1900); Matter of
Moore, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 541 (1876); Connors v. Mango, 207 Wis. 115, 240
N. W. 821 (1932).
7 166 Mass. 189, 44 N. E. 211 (1896), cited in Silver v. United States Trust
Co., 280 Mass. 295, 182 N. E. 372 (1932).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

Ultimately the only one harmed is the contractor, and since he
could not under any recognized principle of law recover directly
any part of the proceeds of the insurance, 8 there is no injustice
or inequity. He has his action against the owner who is richer
by reason of not having to pay a larger deficiency.
The decision seems sound inasmuch as it is supported by adjudicated Illinois decisions and is the weight of authority in
American jurisdictions.9 On the one doubtful point-the distribution of proceeds of insurance after repairs have been made
and after defaults have occurred-it is a case of first impression
in this jurisdiction, and, while seemingly inequitable, there is no
theory apparent on which the court could have decided otherwise.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
ERRATUM-In the June issue of the CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW,
Vol. XIII, p. 266, the quotation contained in lines 7-9, should
be corrected to read: "Under the practice which obtained prior
to January 1, 1934, this judgment being a unit as to both the
creamery company and the cartage company, it cannot be affirmed as to one and reversed as to the other."

8 Lindley v. Orr, supra.
9

26 C. J. 942, and see footnote 3.

